We revisit two-person one-dimensional pure location gamesà la Anderson et al. (1992) and show that they admit continuous best-response potential functions (Voorneveld, 2000) if demand is sufficiently elastic (to the extent that the Principle of Minimum Differentiation fails); if demand is not that elastic (or is completely inelastic) they still admit continuous quasi-potential functions (Schipper, 2004) . We also show that, even if a continuous best-response potential function exists, a generalized ordinal potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) need not exist.
transportation cost be equal across sellers, we have a pure location game. A thorough study of such pure location games is done by Anderson et al. (1992, Chapter 8.2) . They showed, in particular, that if demand is completely inelastic, or elastic but not too elastic, the two sellers agglomerate at the center of the market at equilibrium, namely, Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation holds; if, on the other hand, the demand is sufficiently elastic, the central agglomeration at equilibrium disappears, i.e., the principle ceases to hold true. 1
See also Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for pure location games in general.
In this paper, we revisit two-person pure location gamesà la Anderson et al. (1992) , 2 shedding some new light on them. We show that these games admit continuous best-response potential functions (Voorneveld, 2000) if demand is sufficiently decreasing in distance 3 (to the extent that the central agglomeration ceases to hold true); if demand is not that decreasing (or is constant) they still admit continuous quasi-potential functions (Schipper, 2004) . Thus, in these games, continuous potential functions are securing the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. We also show that even if a continuous best-response potential function exists, a generalized ordinal potential function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) need not exist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the game and give some preliminaries. In Section 3, we show our main results. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
Preliminaries 2.1 The game
Denote by S the compact real interval [0, L] , where L is a positive real number. Also, denote by f a real-valued continuous positive function defined on [0, ∞[ that is constant or strictly decreasing. Throughout, f is assumed to be continuous and positive, unless otherwise stated.
We denote by G = (S, f ) a two-person game in strategic form such that the strategy set is S and the payoff functions u i : S × S → R (i = 1, 2) are defined as follows:
1 We note that their condition of agglomeration (Anderson et al., 1992, page 282, Eq. (6) ) is equivalent to (the converse of) our Eq. (8) that demarcates our two cases.
2 To be fair, we note that their analysis of two-person pure location games is just an opening of their comprehensive analyses of location games with more than two players, entry, and price competition; our analysis is limited in scope compared to theirs. 3 The decreasingness of demand in delivered price turns into the decreasingness of demand in distance in pure location games.
where, with {i, j} = {1, 2}, V i (x 1 , x 2 ) = {y ∈ S | |y − x i | < |y − x j |} and V 0 (x 1 , x 2 ) = {y ∈ S | |y − x 1 | = |y − x 2 |}. 4 We refer to f as a demand function.
This game is a symmetric game, i.e., the payoff functions satisfy
which we will refer to as player symmetry. In addition, each u i satisfies yet another symmetry, which we will call location symmetry:
Potential games
There are several notions of potential functions (potentials, for short). Let N = {1, . . . , n} and let ((S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) be a general n-person game in strategic form, where S i and u i : × j∈N S j → R are the strategy set and the payoff function of player i ∈ N , respectively. For i ∈ N , s ∈ × j∈N S j , and s i ∈ S i , we denote by s \ s i ∈ × j∈N S j a strategy profile obtained from s by replacing the ith element with s i . Let P : × j∈N S j → R. P is said to be a generalized ordinal potential of G (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) if for any i, s, s i
P is said to be a best-response potential of G (Voorneveld, 2000) if for any i, s arg max
If "=" in (5) is weakened to "⊇" then P is called a pseudo-potential of G (Dubey et al., 2006) . P is called a quasi-potential of G (Schipper, 2004 ) if for any s s i ∈ arg max
A game having a generalized ordinal potential is called a generalized ordinal potential game, and so on. If a game G belongs to any one of these classes of potential games, and if the potential therein has a maximum, then any maximizer of the potential is a pure Nash equilibrium of G. 
It is known that there is no non-trivial cyclic improvement path in a generalized ordinal potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) .
Analysis

The results
Let G = (S, f ) and let u i : S 2 → R be defined by (1). As is well-known, the best response may be empty if the demand function f is constant (f = c): Indeed, since
we have arg max
Clearly, this game does not admit continuous best-response potential (by Weierstrass's Theorem). As we shall see in Remark 3.1 below, the situation is not so different if f is strictly decreasing and
, a situation where the Principle of Minimum Differentiation holds true (Anderson et al., 1992, page 282) . 5 Let us first consider the case
and express the payoff functions given by (1) as
Define P : S 2 → R by
Note that P is continuous irrespective of the continuity of f .
and a strictly decreasing f satisfying
admits a continuous best-response potential P : S 2 → R defined by (7).
5 To be precise, it holds true iff 1 2
. See also our Concluding Remark 2.
Proof. By player symmetry (2) and P (x 1 , x 2 ) = P (x 2 , x 1 ), it suffices to show (5) for i = 1. Let B(x 2 ) := arg max
By location symmetry (3) and
By the continuity of f , we can choose > 0 such that < L−x 2 − and
where the first inequality is by L(x 2 ) < R(x 2 ), and the second by 2
since x 1 will add (resp. increase) demand from the interval [L − 2x 2 , L] for u 1 (·, x 2 ) (resp.
That is, u 1 (·, x 2 ) is not continuous at x 1 = x 2 , and u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) < u 1 (x 1 + , x 2 ) for a small > 0.
Nevertheless, the condition
on the other hand, B(x 2 ) may be empty for some x 2 . To see this, observe that for y 1 > x 2 with x 2 < L 2 , u 1 (·, x 2 ) is continuously differentiable at y 1 and
That is, we have
2 ) is decreasing in x 1 . With (10), this says that u 1 (·, x 2 ) has no maximum on [x 2 , L]. Also, with (9), which also holds here, it has no maximum on [0, L], namely, B(x 2 ) = ∅, while M (x 2 ) = ∅ since P is continuous. Hence in this case P defined by (7) cannot be a best-response potential, nor even a pseudo-potential
Before we proceed, we note that if (x 1 , x 2 ) is an equilibrium of G, then x 1 + x 2 = L, and the equilibrium is unique up to player symmetry. 6 To see this, note first that (
2 ) is the unique equilibrium of G if f is constant. Asume then that f is strictly decreasing, x 2 ≤ x 1 , without loss of generality, and suppose x 1 + x 2 < L. If x 2 = x 1 , then, by (10), we have u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) < u 1 (x 1 + , x 2 ) for a small > 0, a contradiction. If x 2 < x 1 , note that
and x 2 = 0 since
2 ) = 0 by the first order condition, and f (L − x 1 ) = f (x 2 ), contradicting the strict decreasingness of
is also an equilibrium by location symmetry (3), and the above argument also implies (
For the uniqueness, suppose that (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 1 , x 2 ) are two equilibria such that x 2 ≤ x 1 , x 2 ≤ x 1 , and x 1 < x 1 . Then u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) implies
6 These points are also shown by Anderson et al. (1992) . However, we include our proofs for the sake of completeness.
2 , this contradicts the strict decreasingness of f . Hence equilibrium must be unique; it is unique up to player symmetry since
Proposition 3.2. G = (S, f ) with a strictly decreasing f admits a continuous quasi-potential P : S 2 → R defined by (7).
Proof. We show ' ⇐= ' in (6), i.e., that any maximizer of P is an equilibrium. This and the uniqueness of equilibrium (up to player symmetry) imply (6).
Suppose (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ arg max s∈S 2 P (s). Assume x 2 ≤ x 1 without loss of generality (by
. Since these contradict the maximality of P (x 1 , x 2 ), we must have
Then L(x 2 ) = R(x 1 ). We distinguish two cases.
. Hence x 1 ∈ arg max x 1 ∈S u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). We also have x 2 ∈ arg max x 2 ∈S u 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) by player symmetry.
this says that 2u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≤ 2u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). Hence x 1 ∈ arg max x 1 ∈S u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). We also have x 2 ∈ arg max x 2 ∈S u 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) by player symmetry.
In passing, we note that G = (S, f ) with S = [0, L] and a constant f has a unique equilibrium (
2 ), as is well known. Clearly,P : S 2 → R defined bȳ
for example, is a continuous quasi-potential of G.
Non-existence of a generalized ordinal potential
Having established that G belongs to the class of quasi-potential games, and more strongly best-response potential games (with a continuous best-response potential) if f is a sufficiently decreasing strictly decreasing function, we now show that G is not necessarily a generalized ordinal potential game, to narrow the class to which G belongs.
Proposition 3.3. G = (S, f ) with a sufficiently decreasing strictly decreasing f is not necessarily a generalized ordinal potential game.
Proof. If G has a generalized ordinal potential then it cannot have any non-trivial cyclic improvement path. We provide a counterexample, i.e., an example of G having a non-trivial cyclic improvement path. Let f (z) = w z with a constant w such that 0 < w ≤ 1. Then, for the game G = (S, f ) with S = [0, 3], player 1's payoffs at integer points are as given in Figure 1 . By Proposition 3.1, this game is a best-response potential game if 4 Concluding remarks
We have shown that if f is strictly decreasing and satisfies
) then G admits a continuous best-response potential (Proposition 3.1) but may not be a generalized ordinal potential game (Proposition 3.3). The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium follows from the continuity of the best-response potential P defined by (7) .
In general, the same continuous function P is a quasi-potential if f is a strictly decreasing function (Proposition 3.2), and such a G has a unique equilibrium up to player symmetry (see fn. 6). Clearly, G with a constant f also has a continuous quasi-potential and a unique equilibrium (
2. Let G = (S, f ) with a strictly decreasing f . Then we can locate the unique (up to player symmetry) equilibrium (x 1 , x 2 ) of G in the following way. 7 Suppose x 2 ≤ L 2 . Here x 2 = 0, since otherwise (x 1 , x 2 ) = (L, 0), and
2 ) as in (11), so 
with x 1 = L − x 2 . Eq. (13) is the first order condition ∂ ∂x 1 u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ) = 0 that has to be satisfied at the equilibrium (x 1 , x 2 ) such that x 2 < x 1 . If −f ( (Anderson et al., 1992) . Thus, with Proposition 3.1, G = (S, f ) such that 1 2 f (0) = f ( L 2 ) is a game that admits a continuous best-response potential and the Principle. 3. We have shown that any G = (S, f ) in this paper has some potential function, among which the quasi-potential function is the most general one. A further generalization of potential function is possible: replace ' ⇐⇒ ' in (6) with ' ⇐= '. Such a potential function may be called a weak quasi-potential function. Note that the continuity of f is not used in the part of the proof of Proposition 3.2, where ' ⇐= ' in (6) is being proved. Thus, G = (S, f ) with a strictly decreasing not necessarily continuous f can be said to be a weak quasi-potential game.
4. As a final remark, we note that: If the strategy set is circular (as in Salop (1979) ), then the two-person location games with payoff functions given by (1) is an exact potential game. The proof is straightforward. The game is then an identical interest game, which is an exact potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) .
